This article discusses the controversy over whether attribution (recognition) of emotions from facial expressions is universal (P. Ekman, 1994; C. E. Izard, 1994; J. A. Russell, 1994) . Agreement emerged on various issues. There exists at least Minimal Universality (people everywhere can infer something about others from their facial behavior). Anger, sadness, and other semantic categories for emotion are not pancultural and are not the precise messages conveyed by facial expressions. Emotions can occur without facial expressions, and facial expressions can occur without emotions. Further evidence is needed to determine the relationship between emotion and facial behavior, what determines that relationship, how facial behavior is interpreted, and how much the interpretation varies with culture and language. Ekman's (1994) objections are answered.
tions from facial expression. I agree with Izard's suggestion that the topic of these studies was actually "universal semantic attribution." This phrase is better than what has been used in the past. The phrase "recognition of emotion" presupposes that emotions are in the face to be recognized. The phrase "universality thesis" admits of various interpretations: It might mean universality of attribution (my topic), but it might also mean universality of facial movements (which can be assumed), that the attributions made in the judgment studies were correct (a hypothesis not tested by the judgment studies), or that there is a universal causal link between emotions and facial movements (also not tested). This last point bears emphasis. Across the world's cultures, do happy people smile? Do angry people frown? Evidence on such questions is missing. The cross-cultural judgment studies do not bear directly on this issue but on the attribution of emotion. That faces universally express emotions remains to be tested. I focused on cross-cultural judgment studies not to champion their method but because those studies have played such a key role in the psychology of emotion. The judgment study is concerned with essentially a problem in social cognition: How do observers interpret facial behavior? The most common method used (matching words to facial poses) moves away from the study of spontaneous facial behavior in its natural context and away from the study of noncognitive responses to the facial behavior of others. (It is faintly ironic that emotion researchers paid so little attention to emotional reactions to facial behaviors.) The evidence that I reviewed does not bear directly on Izard's (1994) main concern, genetic and epigenetic influences on facial behavior (see Fridlund, 1994 , for a review). In this regard, I agree with Izard on the importance of studying facial behavior in infancy, although we differ in the conclusions we draw from the evidence currently available (see Fogel et al., 1992 , for a review).
These qualifications notwithstanding, the importance of the cross-cultural judgment studies is very great. For example, Ekman (1973) had earlier called the evidence from these studies definitive and conclusive on the universality of certain facial expressions of emotion and their recognition, and he continued to 379 find it to be overwhelming support for his Neuro-Cultural Theory of Emotion (Ekman, 1994) . I think that Ekman and Izard would join me in saying that it is time for everyone to reexamine this evidence and that, in doing so, the field must not rely on secondary sources (even if each of us might have different secondary sources in mind). Too many writers have repeated some vague statement of universality, together with an oversimplified account of the evidence thought to support it, all bought second hand. The clash of interpretations seen here should put an end to that. I foresee a rush to the library to reread the original sources. Rethinking this much cited evidence should stimulate new interpretations, new hypotheses, and therefore new research.
Emotion Words
Let me join Ekman (1994) and Izard (1994) in noting that the evidence I reviewed is highly dependent on words. I agree with them that problems of translation are therefore a potential source of error that must be considered when evaluating the results of the judgment studies. A focus on words also raises other, more fundamental issues.
I certainly agree with Ekman's (1994) comments about how words are related to emotions-in fact, he expressed a point that I have been trying to make for years. Quoting from a previous publication (Ekman, 1989, p. 159) , he wrote, Emotion terms can be thought of as a kind of shorthand, an abbreviated way to refer to a package of events and processes, . . .
[including] antecedent events, the physiological and motor responses, the memories, thoughts, images, and information processing, and the mobilization of efforts to cope with the source of emotion. All or any of these may be implied when someone says "he looks angry." (Ekman, 1994, p. 270) Merry Bullock and I wrote, When we say that someone is afraid, we combine in one word a series of consecutive events dependent on one another. To know the meaning of the word fear is to know that sequence. It is to know a script (Abelson, 1981) in which events unfold in a certain order. The concept-the script-specifies the prototypical elements, their order, and their causal connections: context, appraisal of the context, physiological reactions, feelings, vocal expressions, facial expressions, actions, and consequences. (Russell & Bullock, 1986, p. 336) According to the script (or as Ekman [1994] would say, package) account, no one subevent of the sequence is necessary, and different scripts (such as those for anger and fear) may share subevents. As with Roschian prototypes (see Fehr & Russell, 1984) , instances of scripts resemble each other to various degrees and in various ways. A particular script, such as that for anger, has different instantiations in different contexts (Russell & Fehr, 1994) . The presence or absence of anger, as commonly understood, cannot be indexed by the presence or absence of any single feature, such as a particular facial expression. There is no one-to-one correspondence between an emotion word and a facial expression. As Ekman (1994) said, "The matching up of words and facial expressions is imperfect, at least in part, because they each convey what the other cannot" (p. 270).
This new understanding of the concepts labeled by emotion words has direct implications for psychological theories and studies on how people understand facial expressions. If faces and emotion words each convey what the other cannot, then facial expressions should not be labeled with single emotion words, such as the facial expression of anger. Both the forcedchoice and the free-label response formats should go because observers are forced to match a facial expression with something it cannot convey, a single emotion word. And one must finally face the inevitable question, just what does a facial expression convey? Ekman (1994) and Izard (1994) also cited evidence that emotion words in different languages do not translate in a oneto-one fashion (see Russell, 1991b , for a review). Some languages have no words translatable as anger, fear, sadness, and so on. Differences are widespread (Wierzbicka, 1986 (Wierzbicka, , 1992 and occasionally dramatic (Briggs, 1970; Howell, 1981; Levy, 1973; Lutz, 1982; Rosaldo, 1980) . One version of the universal semantic attribution hypothesis must therefore be reformulated. If emotion words are not equivalent across languages, then one cannot formulate the hypothesis in terms of words, as was done by Ekman (1973) when he wrote, "Regardless of the language, of whether the culture is Western or Eastern, industrialized or preliterate, these facial expressions are labeled with the same emotion terms: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise" (p. 220). Ekman's (1973) statement might be taken to mean that people everywhere use the same categories when interpreting faces. Anger, fear, sadness, and so on seem such natural and obvious categories-to speakers of English. The observed differences in emotion words across languages, however, suggest the possibility that the underlying mental categories for emotions differ as well. In none of the cross-cultural studies that I reviewed in my original article (Russell, 1994) was the possibility raised that the Dani, Fore, Bahinemo, Japanese, or Chinese might interpret facial expressions differently because they divide the emotions into somewhat different categories than do speakers of English. Of course, differences in words (labeled categories) do not prove differences in unlabeled categories. The semantic attribution hypothesis might therefore be reformulated in terms of implicit (unlabeled) categories. However, implicit categories have to be demonstrated rather than assumed.
Finally, these possibilities underscore another neglected question. What exactly is the process that intervenes between the occurrence of a facial expression and an observer's overt response to that facial expression? Is the process perception, labeling, judgment, inference, or something else? Does the process involve categories at all, or is it a direct perception of emotional meaning? Must observers try to figure out the meaning of a given facial expression, or is the process automatic? I suggested the word attribution, but the nature of that process remains obscure.
In summary, the issues raised by Ekman (1994) and Izard (1994) about the meaning of emotion words and about their translation between languages cannot be thought of merely as sources of random error in cross-cultural studies. Instead, these are urgent conceptual and empirical issues central to understanding this area.
The Cross-Cultural Studies and Their Technical Problems
The cross-cultural judgment studies yielded recognition scores (the percentage of observers who associated a smile with happy, a frown with angry, etc.). Were the recognition scores so high, so uniform across cultures, and so revealing that they require a theoretical interpretation along the lines proposed by Ekman (1994) and Izard (1994) ? The higher the recognition scores, the more compelling is that interpretation. The lower the recognition scores, the more plausible become alternative accounts.
The observed recognition scores varied with culture and method. To illustrate cultural variation, Figure 1 summarizes average recognition scores based on the standard method in three broad cultural groups. As shown, for every facial expression except "happiness," the amount of agreement with Ekman's (1994) and Izard's (1994) prediction declines as the culture groups become less Western. Ekman and Izard interpreted such variation as due largely to factors (such as difficulties in translation) that can obscure the hypothesized signal (the pancultural message of the facial expression). I considered this interpretation and, therefore, listed Ekman's and Izard's accounts among the possible explanations of the data. On the other hand, the judgment studies might include forces in the opposite direction, systematic distortions that would inflate recognition scores. So, Ekman, Izard, and I agree that recognition scores cannot be taken at face value. We agree that there is error variance, but what is its nature?
I (Russell, 1994) argued that the studies contained a series of method factors (response format, within-subject design, etc.), each of which might have inflated recognition scores. No one bias need be very powerful for many of them to mount up. Ekman (1994) analyzed each such factor in turn, concluding each time that the factor does not challenge universality. This rebuttal missed the point on two counts. First, as I elaborate later, I do not challenge universality in the weaker versions that Ekman presented (the absence of Arbitrary Pairing or of Random Responding). Second, no one method factor alone need challenge the full size of the recognition scores; rather, they do so in combination. Focus on the height of each bar in Figure 1 , especially for the non-Western groups. Picture each bar in Figure 1 shrinking by just a few percentage points each time an inflationary bias is removed. I think that psychology has arrived at a point where evidence can resolve this particular dispute, and this may be beginning. For example, Tanaka-Matsumi, Seiden, Xydas, and Lam (1994) recently found that the commonly used within-subject design results in higher recognition scores than does a between-subjects design.
What Hypotheses Are Ruled Out?
The central question raised by our exchange is this: What conclusions follow from the available cross-cultural judgment studies? Let me begin by agreeing with Ekman (1994) and Izard (1994) that the weight of evidence speaks against two hypotheses.
Hypothesis of Arbitrary Pairing
Consider a set of commonly proposed facial patterns: the smile, the nose wrinkle, the frown, and so on. Consider a set of commonly proposed categories of emotion: happiness, disgust, anger, and so on. Assume that American college students can Table 17 ). White horizontal lines within each bar indicate level due to chance used by Ekman (1994) . JV = number of samples.
pair each of these facial patterns with one of the emotion categories with a high degree of consensus: The smile is associated with happiness, the nose wrinkle with disgust, the frown with anger, and so on. According to the Hypothesis of Arbitrary Pairing, these specific pairings are unique to Western culture: People of different cultures attend to these same facial patterns and divide emotions into these same categories, but they pair the faces and emotion categories in different ways. For example, the smile might be consensually paired with disgust in one society isolated from the West, paired with anger in another, and so on. Arbitrary Pairing has not been found.
Hypothesis of Random Responding
Consider the same set of facial patterns and categories of emotion. According to the Hypothesis of Random Responding, people of cultures and languages isolated from the West cannot pair the facial patterns with the emotion categories in anything but a random fashion. This hypothesis was rejected when the judgment studies under review obtained statistically significant amounts of agreement. In other words, the null hypothesis rejected in the statistical test was the Hypothesis of Random Responding. Statistical significance was clear for most facial expressions for student observers in literate societies, both Western and non-Western, even when method artifacts were considered. In more isolated, illiterate societies, statistical significance was less clear but likely the case as well, at least for several facial expressions and when situations were substituted for emotion categories. Observers are not random in associating facial expressions with emotion categories or perhaps situations. I do not find the evidence conclusive on this point: Whether situations can be substituted for emotion categories is questionable; there are methodological problems; the sample of non-Western cultures is small; evidence on cultures isolated from the West is especially weak; and there is the disturbing linear relation between the degree of Westernization and support for this conclusion. Random Responding, however, can reasonably be ruled out.
What Hypothesis Is Ruled In?
Once the two hypotheses just stated are ruled out, one is still left with various alternatives. Ekman's (1994) Neuro-Cultural Theory and Izard's (1994) Differential Emotions Theory are but one type of interpretation. There are others. I listed eight (Russell, 1994) , and there are undoubtedly more. For example, observers might interpret facial expressions in terms of culturespecific emotion categories, of emotional dimensions rather than discrete emotion categories, of action readiness (a frown is getting ready to attack), or of situations (a frown is a response to a frustrating situation). Observers might simply distinguish pleasant from unpleasant facial expressions. The cross-cultural judgment studies do not allow acceptance of any one of these alternatives. Izard (1994) largely agreed with me on this point. He emphasized that the judgment studies bear on the universal semantic attribution hypothesis, rather than on the innateness of facial expressions or on his Differential Emotions Theory (which my article did not cover). He did not argue that the currently available cross-cultural judgment studies rule out any of the eight alternative options that I (Russell, 1994) described. To decide among these alternatives, Izard agreed, further evidence would have to be offered.
In contrast, it was not clear whether Ekman (1994) agreed with me on this point or not. In some passages, Ekman seemed to maintain only that the Hypotheses of Arbitrary Pairing and Random Responding were ruled out. On that conclusion, he and I agreed. We would also have agreed if Ekman had concluded that his theory is one candidate among others-that was one conclusion I (Russell, 1994) 
Minimal Universality and Beyond
To help clarify our exchange, let me rephrase the problem in an oversimplified but useful way. Imagine a continuum concerning the amount of universality in the attribution of emotion to someone on the basis of facial expression. At one extreme is the position that the perceived relations of facial movements to emotions are, as Ekman (1994, p. 286 ) put it, "totally socially constructed and culturally variable;" the amount of universality is 0% (both Arbitrary Pairing and Random Responding fall at 0). At the other extreme of this continuum is the position of total invariance across cultures and languages: The perceived relations of facial movements to emotions are completely fixed (possibly but not necessarily by genes); the amount of universality is 100%.
Neither extreme of this continuum, 0% or 100%, is plausible. No one today advocates either extreme, and no one should attribute either extreme to anyone else. (I later discuss more historical positions.) Ekman (1994) and Izard (1994) emphasized that the amount of universality is significantly greater than 0%. I concluded (Russell, 1994 ) that 0% universality is implausible and asked how far up the continuum the evidence would go. Neither Ekman nor Izard defended 100% universality. So, we agree that the amount of universality is greater than 0% but less than 100%. There is thus more agreement even on the central issue than might have been apparent. The extremes are probably not worth talking about, but many qualitatively different positions between the extremes are. The lower end of this continuum specifies nothing more than a vague similarity across cultures. The single continuum I describe here must therefore be replaced by specific hypotheses about what exactly is universal and why and what exactly varies with culture and why. So, we arrive again at the eight alternative accounts I discussed in my article, which included the Ekman-Izard approach as one possibility, and all of which presupposed some degree of universality.
What is to be done? I am afraid that this controversy cannot be resolved by lively exchanges but by gathering evidence. More important, the gathering of new evidence must be preceded by a new conceptual framework. In the past, psychologists have been offered an either-or choice between a baseline (either Arbitrary Pairing or Random Responding) and Universality with a capital U, that is, the strong universality position often attributed to Ekman and Izard. It is time to abandon that simple framework. A new baseline and clearer hypotheses are needed. Tests among rival hypotheses are needed. The vague phrase universality position needs to be abandoned because it does not refer to a single proposition but to an extended family of possibilities.
To help define a better baseline, I outline in Table 1 a position I call Minimal Universality. This position is neither a statement of my own beliefs nor an assessment of the actual degree of universality. Minimal Universality is a baseline consistent with a small but statistically significant amount of agreement across cultures in interpreting facial expressions but postulates no special relation between emotions and facial expressions. My own belief is that something more interesting than minimal universality will be found, but what remains to be established. Table 1 provides some plausible assumptions for this new baseline position. From these assumptions follow certain predictions; these predictions are consistent with the available evidence. Table 1 also explicitly notes some further assumptions that are not included in Minimal Universality because they are not needed to account for the current evidence. Minimal Universality is intended to replace the current baselines implicit in the research and writing so far, namely, Arbitrary Pairing and Random Responding. These two are implausible enough that they are no longer sufficient as null hypotheses. The task for the future is to state specific hypotheses stronger than Minimal Universality and to show how evidence can differentiate the new hypothesis from Minimal Universality. Similar to any null hypothesis, Minimal Universality might seem dull, but it must be rejected before any more interesting hypothesis can be accepted. The challenge is, in other words, what can be established beyond Minimal Universality? For that, specific hypotheses are needed to test.
Cultural Issues
The hypotheses to test should specify in what precise terms the people of any specific culture interpret facial expressions. As illustrated in Figure about biologically based facial signals of emotion means little in the absence of information on such questions. This information is needed to assess the ecological validity of current evidence and to interpret it properly. It is also needed for its own sake.
As an illustration of why such information is needed, consider just one ecological question: For a given culture, what is the naturally occurring correlation between facial expression and emotional experience? (How often are smiling people happy, and how often do happy people smile? And so on with other emotions and types of facial actions.) Ekman (1994) and Izard (1994) agreed that facial expressions can occur without emotions and that emotions can occur without facial expressions. Indeed, Izard allowed "for the complete independence of expression and feeling" (p. 290). The correlation between facial expression and emotion might also vary with culture-this possibility follows from Izard's emphasis on the role of socialization in facial behavior and from Ekman's emphasis on cultural differences in display rules. So the question is, What is the degree of correlation between facial expression and emotion? What is that correlation in different societies?
Encountering the statement that universal facial expressions have been established for a set of emotions, readers might be forgiven for assuming that high correlations have been established in a reasonable sample of the world's societies. To my knowledge, there is almost no cross-cultural evidence on this question (as opposed to the question of whether people attribute emotions to facial expressions). There is very little evidence even from the usual group, American college students, and that evidence suggests a rather low correlation (see Fridlund, 1994 , for a review). (Incidentally, the stronger assertion that emotions universally cause facial action has received even less attention.)
In short, it is possible that the naturally occurring correlation between facial action and emotion is low and varies with culture. This possibility raises further questions. I illustrate with just three. First, emotion is sometimes defined as including facial expression as one component, and facial expression is sometimes taken as an index of the presence of the emotion (Ekman, 1993; Izard, 1971) . Would this definition be justified in a society in which emotions frequently occur without facial expressions and in which facial expressions frequently occur without emotions? More generally, defining emotion to include a facial component seems premature in absence of information on the ecological correlation between the two.
My second question is what determines when a facial expression will be associated with an emotion. Once the notion is abandoned that facial expression and emotion are invariably linked, then one must ask why they are linked when they are and why not when they are not. On the basis of evolutionary theory, Fridlund (1994) proposed that the key factor is social motivation. Dramatic evidence for this proposal comes from observations of Olympic gold-medal winners (Fernandez-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, in press). Experiencing arguably some of the happiest moments of their lives, the winners smiled much during specific social presentations but little before or after.
My third question concerns how children come to attribute emotions to facial expressions. According to Ekman and Friesen (1975) , children must learn to do so. If they must learn, then the lower the correlation between facial expression and emotion, the more difficulty children ought to experience in this learning task. Moreover, the lower the correlation, the less justification there is for assuming that people are accurate when they attribute an emotion to someone on the basis of facial expression, even when that attribution is in perfect agreement with Ekman's (1994) and Izard's (1994) predictions. So if the correlation between facial expression and emotion varies with culture and if it can be low, then would Ekman and Friesen's theory even predict universal attribution of emotion from facial expression? Would not attribution and its accuracy depend on culture?
Ekman's Objections Ekman's (1994) serious objections to my review (Russell, 1994) require answers. As Ekman pointed out, I had overlooked a set of quantitative ratings reported by Matsumoto and Ekman (1989) , and I had misunderstood how Ekman et al. (1987) scored their data on a group rather than on an individual basis.
Ekman believed that my article slighted his theory and his contribution. It was not my intention to do so. But perhaps I should have expanded the scope of my article to present and to analyze Ekman's theory, which has been very influential, and to detail his role, which has been very important, in the history of this field. Ekman, like Izard, is a distinguished scientist, a leader in making the study of emotion a thriving interdisciplinary enterprise.
However, where Ekman (1994) saw misrepresentation, distortion, inaccuracy, faulty logic, straw men, red herrings, empty arguments, more red herrings, faulty statistics, and omission of crucial information, he and I disagree.
Part of our disagreement may stem from his misunderstanding my purpose. I presented my review (Russell, 1994) as my turn in a continuing social dialogue. (I hope the present article is seen in the same light.) I am sorry if my conclusions made anyone uncomfortable, but it was time for a fresh examination of this area, and I had to call the shots as I saw them. It is useful in science to distinguish theories, assumptions, or common sense from what the evidence has actually established. When examining an idea presupposed since Homer wrote the Iliad (Izard, 1994) , it is not easy to disentangle what precisely the data establish from one's own embellishments and interpretations. My aim was to write a review in what is perhaps considered an old-fashioned style, that is, as independent as possible of what I believe, focusing on what precise conclusions follow from the data, given the methods used to gather the data.
Ekman's (1994) response was to an article I sometimes had difficulty recognizing as my own. There were too many misunderstandings even to list. He debated topics I never raised, denied conclusions I never drew, described me as conceding conclusions that I did draw, and repeated some of my own conclusions as if they were a rebuttal. 1 Ekman described me as dismissing, ignoring, and trying to undermine or discredit findings; I saw my article differently. I am not sure how what he wrote addressed my central concerns, such as ecological and internal validity and the existence of alternative explanations for the available data. For the most part, I must let my original article (Russell, 1994) speak for itself. In this article, I consider only Ekman's major objections, and even then I omit those for which I would be tempted simply to repeat from my original article. Ekman (1994) raised three points about my statistical analysis.
Faulty Statistics
1 For example, Ekman (1994) objected that I misrepresented his position regarding free listing of emotion terms, creating a straw man who excludes synonyms. Here is what I said about my free-listing data: "If anger, mad, perturbed, irritable, and pissed off are considered synonyms, then 40.6% gave the expected label. If frustration is added to the list of correct responses, then 71.2% of responses would be counted correct" (Russell, 1994, p. 120 ). Ekman's rebuttal simply repeated what I said, leaving out perturbed: "Iffrustration, anger, irritable, mad, and pissed off are considered to be members of the anger family of words, then the data in Russell's Table 10 yields 70.9% agreement" (Ekman, 1994, p. 275) . In a summary of this section of his article, Ekman wrote, "I. . . reanalyzed Russell's own findings" (p. 278).
1. Ekman (1994) asked, "What level of agreement should be required to establish universality? ... the standard should be whether the amount of agreement was statistically significant" (p. 268). "I thought that formal statistical findings are what settle such matters" (p. 271). He asked, "Why did [Russell] not accept statistically significant findings?" (p. 282). Ekman linked statistical significance to support for his specific theory: "The findings . . . provide strong support for the neuro-cultural theory of emotional expression. The findings were statistically significant. . ." (p. 272). This passage was not alone in making statistical significance the criterion of validity for his Neuro-Cultural Theory. In his conclusion, he repeated, "The evidence. . . is overwhelming in support of my neuro-cultural theory of facial expression. With almost no exceptions, statistically significant levels of cross-cultural agreement were obtained" (p. 282).
Of course, I (Russell, 1994) did accept statistically significant findings as ruling out the null hypothesis (Random Responding). Ruling out the null hypothesis does not constitute overwhelming support for any specific theory. Statistical significance in the studies reviewed meant that the amount of agreement observed was unlikely to have occurred on the null hypothesis that observers randomly selected among the response options. As far as the statistics are concerned, nonrandom selection could have been achieved according to Ekman's (1994) theory, through any other of the eight alternative accounts that I described in my review, through Minimal Universality, or through any one or more other nonrandom process, including different base rates in the use of emotion words, experimenter expectancy effects, artifacts in the experimental protocol, "learning to learn" over the course of the experiment, and an uncountable number of other mechanisms. Statistical significance per se does not settle such matters. Ekman's specific theory would be strongly supported only if there were no plausible rival explanation for the data.
2. "Although Russell [1994] said he took account of violations of sphericity, when we recomputed his ANO\A, we found that he had not done so.... When we recomputed the analyses, taking account of violations of sphericity, the interaction between culture and emotion again was no longer significant" (Ekman, 1994, p. 271, Footnote 3) .
The interaction term in question (Culture X Type of Expression) yielded an F ratio of 2.39. The data are nonspherical, and it is therefore inappropriate to compare this observed value of the Fratio with F crit (5,145) = 2.27 for an alpha of .05. Instead, Box (1954) recommended using a reference distribution with modified degrees of freedom. The degrees of freedom for the numerator and the denominator are multiplied by epsilon, and the significance of the F ratio is evaluated against an F crit with the new degrees of freedom. Two readily available estimators of epsilon are the Greenhouse-Geisser (1959) and the Huynh-Feldt (1976) . The Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of epsilon was .78-resulting in an adjusted F crit (3.90, 113.10) = 2.47; the Greenhouse-Geisser modified F test would indicate that the interaction term is not significant. However, the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon tends to be overly conservative, especially for small sample sizes. To reduce this bias, Huynh and Feldt, Huynh (1978) , and Rogan, Keselman, and Mendoza (1979) recommended using the Huynh-Feldt estimate of epsilon when epsilon is greater than or equal to .75. The Huynh-Feldt estimate of epsilon was .95-resulting in an adjusted F CT i,(4.75, 137.75) = 2.32; the Huynh-Feldt modified Ftest indicated that the interaction term is significant.
3. Ekman (1994) objected that my analysis, which used unweighted means, "may have obscured a crucial fact," namely, that "agreement was extraordinarily high" (p. 272). In 9 of the 12 cases, the unweighted means that I (Russell, 1994) reported were higher than the weighted means that Ekman reported. In the remaining 3 cases, my means were within 1 percentage point of Ekman's.
Misrepresentation
Ekman (1994) used such words as misrepresentation, inaccurate, and mistaken. As already noted, I did overlook data from Matsumoto and Ekman (1989) and misunderstood Ekman et al. (1987) . With these exceptions, however, on careful examination I found that what I wrote was accurate. Ekman (1994) objected that I misrepresented the universality thesis as requiring perfect agreement and "considered any deviation from this standard as evidence against universality" (p. 269). That is not how I framed the issues. Ekman (1994) objected that I cited Izard (1971) as using previewing, "but he did not" (p. 276). What I said was correct (Izard, 1971; personal communications, August 23, 1993, and JulyS, 1994) . Ekman (1994) objected that I unfairly and misleadingly criticized "an investigator for failing to perform a statistical test that the investigator had actually performed" (p. 268) and which I knew had been performed. I made no such criticism; my point in this case was that certain recognition scores that Ekman reported had not been corrected for guessing. They had not. Ekman (1994) objected that I misled readers about how he obtained his photographs of facial expressions. I wrote, "All studies cited in Table 2 used mainly or entirely posed rather than spontaneous expressions" (Russell, 1994, p, 114) . Ekman's had this version: "Although many of the photographs we used originally had been posed, not all were" (Ekman, 1994, p. 277) . Apparently, in some cases, performers were asked to move specific muscles rather than to pose specific emotions. To 2 1 did what I could to verify any statement I made. I requested from Ekman but did not get unpublished manuscripts (such as the one cited by Ekman, 1972 , as "Ekman, Heider, Friesen, & Heider, in preparation" [1972 describing the study of the Dani) and any reports of new evidence related to universality. I sent him earlier drafts of my article, with requests to point out any misunderstanding or inaccuracy. Ekman replied by asking that the manuscript be resent on a floppy disk, which I did. Through correspondence, Ekman pointed to several passages that he thought did not represent his position faithfully, and I made changes accordingly, although apparently not to his satisfaction (see his footnote A3). 1 met with Ekman to discuss my manuscript, but our memories differ dramatically as to what was said at that meeting. Suffice it to say, Ekman's (1994) article, which I saw only after it had been printed, came as a surprise. Requests for further information and earlier drafts were also sent to various colleagues of Ekman (Wallace Friesen, E. Richard Sorenson, Jerry Boucher, Carroll Izard, Phoebe Ellsworth, Linda Camras, and Harriet Oster). Nevertheless, I am responsible for what I wrote, and I stand behind its accuracy. me, this is just another form of posing. Whether you say "look happy," "smile," or "say cheese," the result is posed, not a spontaneous expression of emotion. Ekman (1994) objected that, from what I wrote, "some readers might mistakenly think that in coining the phrase display rules, we had not acknowledged Klineberg's [1938 Klineberg's [ , 1940 earlier contribution" (p. 286). had not acknowledged Klineberg's earlier contribution. did not cite Klineberg. Ekman (1994) objected that I "presented Ducci, Arcuri, W/ Georgis, and Sineshaw's (1982) finding of lower agreement among rural than urban Ethiopians in judging expressions, as reason to question universality" (pp. 275-276). Ekman's characterization of Ducci et al.'s result as one of rural versus urban does make it seem irrelevant to universality. What Ekman did not mention was that the rural Ethiopian sample had had much less contact with Westerners than had the urban sample. Thus, Ducci et al. presented a comparison in which key factors (including culture, language, and education) were held constant, but the amount of agreement with prediction from Ekman's theory was proportional to the degree of Western contact.
The Studies in New Guinea
Ekman (1994) objected to my analysis of his well-known studies carried out in New Guinea (e.g., Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969) . And the discrepancies are serious. The most serious is that I reported one study using the antecedent story (Dashiell) method with the Fore tribe (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Sorenson, 1975 Sorenson, , 1976 . In Ekman's summary, there were two such studies, one by Ekman and Friesen and another separate replication by Sorenson. I thought that Sorenson (1975 Sorenson ( ,1976 reported the same data from the Dashiell method as those reported by Ekman and Friesen (1971) . That is why I quoted Sorenson's observations on how the study was carried out. Sorenson described various opportunities that the Fore participants had to get the expected answers from the experimenters and how very motivated the Fore were to get those answers. Ekman (1994) provided two replies to Sorenson's observations. First, Ekman (1994) interpreted Sorenson as concluding that such methodological difficulties had been "successfully met" (p. 282). I do not interpret Sorenson's words in that fashion. Second, Ekman interpreted Sorenson as writing about a different study, one that Sorenson conducted himself. Sorenson's allegedly separate study used identical sample sizes (189 adults and 130 children) and produced identical results-identical to Ekman's (1975) report, although only "within a percentage point or two of the figures from our findings listed in Table 5 " (Ekman, 1994, p. 281) . Neither Sorenson nor Ekman even mentioned before the existence of two such studies.
In writing my original review (Russell, 1994) ,! had many questions about the studies carried out in New Guinea, and I suggested that publication of a single full report of those studies would be most helpful. I now find myself more puzzled than ever on just what happened in New Guinea. In his current summary, Ekman (1994) left out studies he had reported in the past (including a famous one in which Fore posed facial expressions for emotion stories; photographs of these poses have been widely reproduced to illustrate the Fore studies) and added several independent replications by Sorenson (1975 Sorenson ( , 1976 . The existence of such replications would greatly strengthen the evidence for the reliability of the results. Ekman described the data from the Sadong as gathered with a free label format, whereas described identical results as having been gathered with a forced-choice format. As Ekman (1994) said, this research is "crucial" for the question of whether "shared visual contact was. . . necessary to [the] finding of universality," and "it has been cited so often by others over the last 20 years" (p. 279). I can only urge readers to examine the original sources and urge the original investigators to publish a full report. Ekman (1994) addressed at length my analysis of response format. When the response format is forced choice, the amount of agreement on the emotion conveyed by a given face can be exaggerated. Forced choice funnels a range of interpretations into a single response option. Indeed, forced choice can result in recognition scores ranging from 0% to 100%, depending on the list of options offered to the observer. Forced choice can yield low recognition scores on the correct option and high recognition scores on an incorrect option (correct or incorrect according to Ekman's and Izard's [1994] theories). These assertions are little more than psychometric truisms, but they have also been demonstrated empirically with facial expressions (Russell, 1989 (Russell, , 1993 . Ekman (1994) began by attributing to me the odd conclusion that if observers select disgust for the "anger" facial expression when the word anger is omitted from the list of options in a forced-choice response format, then one can conclude that the "anger" expression does not express anger. My point was just the opposite: What observers select from a restricted list may not tell what one thinks it does. Recognition scores based on forced choice cannot be taken at face value. This point is illustrated by Ekman's own example of color patches. Ekman (1994) imagined giving observers patches of colors. A majority of the observers picked orange for the yellow patch when the word yellow was omitted from the list of response options. My point was that even though the majority picked orange, one would not conclude that orange is somehow correct. One would not infer that these observers really think that yellow is orange. That much is obvious, but the indeterminacy of results from forced choice becomes more insidious when one adds the complexity of other languages. Carry out a thought experiment. Suppose that an experimenter did not realize that yellow was an important option for these observers (perhaps the experimenter speaks a language, such as Dani, that has no word for yellow, or the experimenter has a theory that does not include yellow as a primary color.) The majority choice of orange for the yellow patch might mislead an experimenter who thought that the statistically significant level of agreement obtained on orange meant that orange was the right label for the yellow patch. To return to emotions, does one know that all the relevant responses have been included in the list of six or seven options given to observers, even when one travels to a society with a very different culture and speaking a very different language? (Ekman might reply that his theory tells him the relevant response options, but then the results would more presuppose than test his theory.)
Response Format
The observations I (Russell, 1994) made about forced choice do not automatically invalidate the conclusions previously drawn, but they do suggest the need for caution and for examining other response formats. Ekman (1994) fell into the very trap to which his color example should have alerted him. Ekman wrote, "The fact that subjects chose the words most similar to the words they would have chosen if they had been given the choice . . ." (p. 274). But is this a fact? What would they have chosen if they had been given the choice? Ekman assumed that the answer is the one he predicts, and probably most readers went along with him. Shown the "facial expression of anger," would observers select anger if given that choice? In a small study (Russell, 1994, Ekman (1994) reported recognition scores for six of the seven types of facial expression that Rosenberg and Ekman studied. (The one result that Ekman omitted was a nonsignificant 18% for the "facial expression of contempt") Rosenberg and Ekman had no cross-cultural data and used still photographs of posed facial expressions. (In the same article in which he described Rosenberg and Ekman's results as decisive, Ekman eliminated from further consideration Motley and Camden's [1988] study of spontaneous facial expressions on the grounds that they had no cross-cultural data and that they used still photographs.) Rosenberg and Ekman's results add little conceptually to the present discussion because similar data were already available and therefore taken into account in my original review, to which I must refer the reader (Russell, 1994) . Ekman (1994) continued, There is no reason to think that the same answer to Russell's question would not be obtained across cultures if the Rosenberg and Ekman (1993) study was repeated in different languages. The only exception might be in those languages that have no words for a particular emotion, (p. 275) What happens across cultures is, of course, the question in this controversy, and data are available on labels freely chosen by different cultural groups. One clear trend was that the amount of agreement with Ekman's prediction was directly proportional to the degree of Westernization of the groups tested. The Japanese language, for example, includes words for all the emotions that Ekman hypothesizes, but the majority of Japanese observers labeled Ekman's "fear" expression as surprise (Russell, Suzuki, & Ishida, 1993) . Freely chosen labels gathered in more isolated cultures, the Fore and the Bahinemo (Sorenson, 1975 (Sorenson, , 1976 , provided less support for Ekman's prediction. Ekman (1994) wrote that I distorted history (in an "attempt to cast aspersions" [p. 287] on his scholarship). Ekman and I do interpret this history differently. I cannot agree with Ekman's contention that alternatives to his theory were extreme positions, for example, that Eibl-Eibesfeldt's (1972 position was absolutist and totally universalist. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (personal communication, July 13, 1994) wrote, "My view is certainly not absolutist or totally universalist." Indeed, in 1972, Eibl-Eibesfeldt described his position as occupying the middle ground, less universalist than Ekman's.
Bias in My Historical Account
Similarly, Ekman (1994) objected because I failed to agree that "the reigning belief [before Ekman and Friesen reported their research] in most of the social sciences was that facial expressions were, to use the current lingo, totally socially constructed and culturally variable" (p. 286). I cannot find any evidence, nor does Ekman offer any, supporting this claim. It was certainly not the case for psychologists. I am not convinced that even the few anthropologists whom Ekman (1973) cited all held a view this extreme. For example, LaBarre (1947) began by describing the biological or, in his words, physiological side to emotion. LaBarre then sought to draw attention to "another potential dimension of meaning in the field of emotions, that is to say the cultural dimension" (p. 49). He then listed examples of cultural variation but added, "In the language of gesture all over the world there are varying mixtures of the physiologically conditioned response and the purely cultural one, and it is frequently difficult to analyze out and segregate the two" (p. 57).
Statements of extreme cultural relativity undoubtedly can be found, but at the same time let us not forget the three schools of thought that articulated accounts of how observers interpret facial expressions. I refer to Frijda's (1953 Frijda's ( , 1958 Frijda's ( , 1969 Frijda's ( , 1970 personal communication, October 7, 1994; Frijda & Philipszoon, 1963 ) account and to the dimensional accounts developed by Osgood( 195 5, 1966 Osgood( 195 5, ,1969 andby Wood worth (1938) and his students (Schlosberg, 1941 (Schlosberg, , 1952 (Schlosberg, , 1954 Vinacke, 1949; Woodworm & Schlosberg, 1954) . None of these three schools advocated cultural relativism, and indeed they inspired studies showing some degree of universality (Ciiceloglu, 1970; Osgood, 1955 Osgood, , 1966 Triandis & Lambert, 1958; Vinacke, 1949; Vinacke & Fong, 1955) . Woodworth introduced the notion of broad emotion categories, recently resurrected by Ekman (1994) under the name emotion families as a replacement for discrete emotion categories. Ekman (1994) particularly objected to my portrayal of Klineberg (1938 Klineberg ( , 1940 . According to Ekman, his own is a 3 These data may or may not be consistent with Ekman's notion of emotion families, which replaced his discrete emotion categories. Ekman did not specify which emotions, antecedents, sensations, and so forth are included within each family. He declined to provide me with a copy of his HELEX list of what terms he accepts for each emotion. Incidentally, Carroll (1994) recently came across a similar result. He expanded the standard list of response options (happy, surprise, afraid, anger, sad, and disgust) by adding determination, hope, pain, and puzzled. Recognition scores for two closed-mouth "anger" expressions from Ekman and Friesen (1976) dropped from over 70% with the standard list to less than 40% (and in one case to 0%) with the expanded list.
"universals position" (p. 286) following in Darwin's (1872 Darwin's ( / 1965 footsteps, whereas KJineberg's position was that facial expressions are totally socially constructed and culturally variable and Klineberg was one of Darwin's chief antagonists (Ekman, 1973 (Ekman, , 1980 . Klineberg did emphasize culture more than anyone mentioned in the last paragraph, but as I see it, the version of universality that Ekman (1994) presented is uncannily close to Klineberg's view. Consider Ekman's conclusions about the Fore and KJineberg's about the Chinese. Like Klineberg, Ekman "emphasizes cultural differences," believes that recognition of emotion from the face is learned (Ekman & Friesen, 1975) , and believes that cultures define display rules about facial behavior. Indeed, KJineberg (1938) introduced the concept, although not the name, of display rules, as Ekman (1994) acknowledged. Ekman concluded that some number of Fore greater than chance associate four or five facial expressions with something related to emotion; Klineberg (1938 Klineberg ( , 1940 concluded that certain facial expressions such as crying, laughing, and fear are universal. The difference between Klineberg and Ekman is largely one of context. Klineberg believed that his audience assumed universality and that he had to convince them of any cultural difference. Ekman believed that his audience assumed cultural differences and that he had to convince them of any universality.
My Motives and Intentions
Although Ekman (1994) was vague on this point, he hinted that I had a "bias" (p. 286) or an "agenda" (p. 287) against evolution, biology, heredity, and Darwin. Ekman referred to those who "reject nature" (p. 283), "consider only nurture" (p. 283), and "consider emotion as strictly socially learned" (p. 283). Ekman wrote that I "wrongfully diminished" Darwin's contribution (p. 287) . I have no such bias or agenda. I wrote that Darwin was not the originator of the universality thesis, and Ekman did not challenge the accuracy of what I wrote. Long before Darwin, people assumed that facial expressions were part of human nature. Darwin (1872 Darwin ( /1965 himself pointed this out, and Izard (1994) and I provided several quotations to illustrate the point. Ekman (1994) implied that my alleged misrepresentations and distortions were deliberate ("Russell had to know that we had done what he told the reader we had not done" [ p. 280 ] and "Russell deliberately sought to create a false impression" [p. 287] ). Any such implication is false, but I cannot think that Ekman meant what he said. Such remarks distract from the scientific issues and discourage debate. Ekman and I have always agreed on the value of a good debate. Mistakes are corrected, questions are raised, ambiguities are clarified, alternative interpretations arise, and future possibilities are suggested.
Ekman's Position and Alternatives to It
One issue stood out as central to my difference of opinion with Ekman (1994) . On my interpretation, the evidence from the cross-cultural judgment studies is consistent with a range of different positions. On Ekman's interpretation, such evidence is overwhelming in its support of his neuro-cultural position maintained for 25 years Ekman, 1972 Ekman, , 1973 Ekman, , 1989 Ekman, , 1994 . But what exactly is Ekman's (1994) position, and what data differentially support it over alternative accounts? Specifically, what data support Ekman's position over Minimal Universality, over Frijda's (1953 Frijda's ( , 1958 Frijda's ( , 1969 account, over the position of Woodworth (1938) , or over any of the other alternative accounts I described? Complicating the discussion is Ekman's contention that I misrepresented both his position and the alternatives.
In my original article (Russell, 1994) , I listed Ekman's position among the possible explanations of the data, but I did not detail or analyze the position of any one writer. A reply to Ekman's (1994) central contention requires such an analysis, however. Readers of course must carry out their own analysis, but as I had understood it, Ekman's neuro-cultural position included several roles for culture, plus a high degree of universality: Seven specific facial expressions are biologically prewired signals; as such they are easily understood, whatever the observer's language or culture, in naturally occurring situations, as signs of specific emotions: fear, anger, disgust, and so on. I do not believe that the available evidence supports this strong position over the alternatives. Ekman may even agree, in that he seemed to maintain that this strong version as I just stated it is not and was not his position. He objected when I quoted him on ease of recognition or about naturally occurring situations. He considered the position that the words fear, anger, or disgust convey what facial expressions convey to be a straw man: "We never claimed that facial expressions. . . represent specific verbal labels. Nor did we say that the meaning of any expression is limited to or best captured by a specific single word" (Ekman, 1994, p. 270) . I offer this summary of Ekman's position not as a straw man; I see it as a clear, interesting, and heuristic position. It sharply distinguishes Ekman from his predecessors and, if correct, has implications for much of the psychology of emotion. Some such strong version seems presupposed when Ekman (1992) argued that the findings on facial expressions could help to resolve controversies on the number, nature, and existence of basic emotions. Indeed, Ekman (1984) proposed that facial expressions could help to define exactly what an emotion is. I also believe that this summary is, or was, Ekman's position, and in my defense, I could quote from Ekman's writings. 4 Of course, positions evolve, and Ekman like anyone else can change his mind. Nevertheless, the real issue is deeper.
In the first place, Ekman's (1972 Ekman's ( , 1992 Ekman's ( , 1993 ) theory postulates happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust, contempt, and sadness as the basic emotions. The cornerstone of empirical support for that theory is that observers everywhere agree that these specific emotions are what are signaled by facial expressions 4 All of the assertions I attributed to Ekman came directly from his own writings, which I urge the reader to consult (Ekman, 1972 (Ekman, , 1973 (Ekman, , 1975 (Ekman, , 1980 (Ekman, ,1984 (Ekman, ,1989 (Ekman, , 1992 (Ekman, ,1993 . Tocite one example, consider the matter of single labels for emotions. Ekman emphasized the importance of using single words to define emotional states. Indeed, he refused to recognize the validity of any study that did not use single labels. Writing about their claim to be the first to have discovered a facial expression of contempt, Ekman and Friesen (1988) wrote, "No one else before us had identified a contempt expression, for no prior study had found high agreement among observers. . .when only the word contempt was used to define that emotional state" (p. 18). (Ekman, 1992) . I cited evidence that given different response options, observers achieve equally high agreement associating the same facial expression with different emotion labels. For example, Ekman and Friesen's (1976) "sad" expression was labeled as contempt in one condition and as fear in another. Ekman (1994) replied, "As I have explained, the specifics of which exact word is chosen is not the issue" (p. 273). Ekman made it the issue in testing his theory.
Second, if my summary is incorrect, then I am at a loss how to summarize Ekman's position. Ekman's (1994) article suggested something like the following: Some part of or something related to an emotion (an antecedent, a physiological reaction, a motoric response, a memory, a thought, an image, information processing, or some effort at coping) is inferred from a facial expression at a level of agreement that exceeds chance. I hesitate to offer this summary because I cannot reconcile it with Ekman's (e.g., 1972 Ekman's (e.g., , 1973 Ekman's (e.g., , 1975 earlier writings, and I doubt that it really captures Ekman's position. 5 If under experimental conditions, some number of Fore greater than chance associate the "facial expression of anger" with threatening an enemy rather than with anger (and, of course, threats might stem from fear as well as anger), then that is sufficient for this weak version provided that threats are in some unspecified way associated with emotion and that the amount of agreement is statistically significant (apparently not required for all seven facial expressions). It is unclear what this weak version predicts about spontaneous expressions or about spontaneous attributions made in natural contexts. Although consistent with the data, this weak version has few implications and does not put a great distance between Ekman and his predecessors. This weak version leaves most of the interesting aspects of facial expression unexplored: What precise message does a given facial expression convey? Do people in different cultures infer the same message from the same facial action? Ekman (1994) also offered an even weaker version, essentially the absence of Arbitrary Pairing. He wrote, Russell [ 1994 ] did not present the kind of judgment data necessary to disconfirm the universality position. To do this, Russell would have to find a culture in which the subjects judged the facial expressions we [Ekman and Freisen] have argued indicate anger, disgust, sadness, and happiness to all indicate entirely different emotions. . . . For example, the majority of subjects in this new culture would have to judge all of the sad expressions to be anger, (p. 271-272) 6 The theory implicit in this passage is consistent with the data but hardly strong. Any result short of Arbitrary Pairing-even Random Responding-would support this version. Its confirmation would tell very little about facial expressions or their interpretation. Again, I cannot reconcile this passage with Ekman's (e.g., 1972 Ekman's (e.g., , 1973 Ekman's (e.g., , 1975 earlier writings or believe that it captures his position. On the other hand, Ekman might be distinguishing the "universality position" from his own specific theory; if so, again the question arises of what his position is and what data support it over its alternatives. Ekman (1994) and I disagreed on how to characterize historical alternatives to his theory, and apparently we disagree on how to characterize modern alternatives. Ekman and his colleagues recently wrote, "Note there have been some recent challenges to [ Ekman's ] work, but they are ideologically, not empirically, based and are proposed by those who claim emotions do not exist (Fridlund, 1991) or that emotions are socially constructed and have no biological basis (Russell, 199 la, 1991b (Russell, 199 la, , 1991c " (Cacioppo, Hager,& Ekman, 1993, p. 12) . This characterization is incorrect both for Fridlund (personal communication, July 7,1994 ) and for myself. Of course, if all the alternatives-old and new-were extreme, Ekman's would be the only account occupying the middle ground. Then Ekman could take evidence against the extremes as support for his theory alone. Ekman's (1994) presentation of his own position, of the available evidence, of the history of this field, and of the alternatives to his theory are interrelated parts of his argument. Still, his are not the only possible interpretations. As I see it, Ekman's predecessors were not all extremists. Contemporary alternatives are not all extreme. The middle ground, from say 10% to 90% universality, is occupied by a range of qualitatively different accounts, which may all be consistent with the available evidence. Rather than ideology, bias, or an agenda, advocates of alternative positions are motivated by an honest desire to understand what about facial behavior and its interpretation is common to all human beings and what is different. When Ekman clarifies his own position and considers the alternatives one by one in this light, my guess is that there will be much more that we agree on.
Final Comment
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize something that I thought went without saying: the importance of Izard's and Ekman's work. The Tomkins-Izard-Ekman approach has been and continues to be the single most heuristic research program on facial expression. I also see exciting new directions being taken, some stemming from their approach, others inspired by other points of view (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1986; Camras, 1992; Chovil, 1991; Fernandez-Dols&Ruiz-Belda,in press; Fogel et al., 1992; Manstead & Edwards, 1992; Provine & Yong, 1991; Scherer, 1992; Smith, 1989) . Fridlund (1994) has published what I think is the most exciting new account of facial 5 For example, Ekman (1994) distanced himself from Klineberg (1938 Klineberg ( , 1940 as follows: "Klineberg admitted some universals, [but] these were in gross motor activities such as crying, laughing, and trembling. Klineberg did not propose that facial expressions for anger, fear, sadness, happiness, and so on were universal" (p. 286). Moreover, statistical significance alone does not guarantee that the effect observed is large or meaningful. For example, according to Ekman's analysis reported in his Table 1 , chance agreement was estimated at 25% for four facial expressions; with alpha set at .001, the level of agreement required to reach statistical significance for these data was 29%-just 4 percentage points higher.
6 When defining what I call Arbitrary Pairing, Ekman (1994) did not include all seven of his hypothesized basic emotions but omitted contempt, fear, and surprise. This omission may have occurred because otherwise evidence from the Fore might seem to demonstrate Arbitrary Pairing. The Fore labeled the "sad" expression as anger, the "surprise" expression as fear, and the "contempt" expression as disgust. When al) the available data are taken into account, however, the Fore way of interpreting facial expressions did not fit the hypothesis of Arbitrary Pairings well because the Fore generally labeled positive expressions with positive labels and negative expressions with negative labels. behavior since Darwin's (1872 Darwin's ( /1965 . Finally, in looking back on our exchange, I would like to give the last words (at least in this article) to Ekman and Izard: "Such disputes are never completely settled by the data, but are resolved over time by how generative each position is-what new questions and new findings each [leads] to" (Ekman, 1994, p. 283) . The further "study of facial expressions still holds promise of high payoff" (Izard, 1994, p. 297) .
